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THE PUBLIC GRAZING LANDS
By HUGH E. KINGERY*
Mr. Kingery's thesis is that public lands under the regulation of
the Taylor Grazing Act are managed and restored more effectively
than under prior land laws. He develops this idea by tracing the his-
tory of public domain which gave rise to the Taylor Grazing Act.
Procedure and the rights granted a grazer under the Act are then
analyzed. The author next discusses the enforcement and application
of the Act, emphasizing judicial and later legislative approval for the
resultant range improvement. He concludes with a discussion of
problems confronting the administration of the Act by new use de-
mands for public domain.
I. HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
6C) ANGE wars will probably continue as long as open range
- exists," wrote Circuit Judge Jean Breitenstein in a 1964
opinion involving the federal government's administration of public
lands for grazing.'
The tradition of the open range - uncontrolled use of the public
lands by western livestock men - has meant violence not only be-
tween users and would-be users, but violence to the range itself,
caused by overgrazing and consequent damaging erosion.' By custom,
livestock had been permitted to run loose upon the western range.
The federal government, constitutionally the only body able to limit
use of federal land, tacitly suffered the lands to be so used by failing
to grant citizens the right to graze cattle on these lands.4 The result
was open range, described by the Supreme Court as, "[A]n implied
license . . . that the public lands . . . shall be free to the people who
seek to use them where they are left open and unenclosed....
After generations of free and unlimited use, Congress first im-
posed restrictions on the public grazing lands in 1891, by creating
the National Forests.6 Aims of the act creating National Forests and
objectives of the Taylor Grazing Act,7 passed forty-three years later,
*Member, Colorado Bar; B.A. Cornell University, 1954; J.D. University of Denver,
1965.
'United States v. Morrell, 331 F.2d 498, 500 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, Chournos v.
United States, 379 U.S. 879 (1964).
2 United States v. Thompson, 41 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Wash. 1941) ; 60 YALE L.J. 455,
462 (1951).
3 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
4
Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 352 (1918).
5 
Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 326 (1890).
626 Stat. 1103 (1891), 16 U.S.C. § 471 (1958).
748 Stat. 1269 (1934),43 U.S.C. § 315 (1958).
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coincided. The Supreme Court described the purpose of the National
Forests as preservation of forest land from depredation and destruc-
tion.' Preservation of the range became a necessary correlative objec-
tive, since about a third of the National Forest land was grazing land.
Creation of the forest reserves caused strenuous and violent op-
position, both on the range and in the courts? Early in their history,
the western states had enacted "fence laws" declaring that livestock
which inadvertently wandered onto unfenced land not belonging to
their owners could not be regarded as trespassers.'" When the Forest
Service declared that no one could graze his animals on unfenced Na-
tional Forest land without a permit, many ranchers rebelled. How-
ever, the United States Supreme Court in Light v. United States" re-
jected the rancher's interpretation of the fence law as a license to let
cattle run free, regardless of whose range the animals might stray
onto and regardless of where the rancher might intend them to wan-
der. The Court approved issuance of an injunction prohibiting Light
from grazing his cattle on federal land.
The western federal judges, while sympathetic to the livestock
man, consistently enforced the right of the government to control the
use of its land, a right based on the Constitution's language authoriz-
ing Congress to "dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regula-
tions respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States."" In another case, the Supreme Court held that the
government could deal with its land "precisely as a private individual
may deal with his farming property.""
Nonetheless, the Colorado Supreme Court backed up the rebel-
lious ranchers and specifically rejected Light.4 To do otherwise, said
the Colorado court, would nullify the Colorado fence law. The court
agreed that the fence statute did not apply if the owner has wilfully
8 United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911). See also Ex parte Hyde, 194 Fed.
207, 213 (1904).
9 For a vivid account of the Routt County, Colorado, ranchers' early reactions to the
Forest Service, and of a trumped-up criminal charge against a Forest Ranger, see
BURROUGHS, WHERE THE OLD WEST STAYED YOUNG 278 (1962). The case was
People v. Ratliff, 14th Judicial Court, Routt County, Colorado, June 11, 1909.
1
0
ALASKA REV. STAT. tit. 30, § 03.30.040 (1962); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-341,
24-501 (1956); CAL. AGRi. CODE § 402 (1954); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-13-2
(1963); IDAHO CODE § 25-2201 (1948); MONT. REV. CODE § 46-1409 (1961);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 569.450 (1963); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-17-1 (1953); ORE.
REV. STAT. § 608.015 (1963) ; TEX. CIV. STAT. 3947 '(Vernon's 1960) ; REV. CODE
WASH. ANN. § 16.60.015 (1962); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 11-532 (1957). But see
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-101 (1949) (local option); N.D. GEN. CODE ANN.
§ 36-11-02 (1960) (contra); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 4-12-7 and 4-12-9 (1953)
(common law rule, with local option to modify).
11 220 U.S. 523 (1911). (This case also arose in Routt County, Colorado.)
12 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
'3 Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 524 (1897).
14 Williamson v. Fleming, 65 Colo. 528, 178 Pac. 11 (1918).
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or wantonly driven his cattle to trespass,"5 but held that if the owner
merely leaves his cattle to drift, although he knows they will trespass
onto government lands, the fence law protects him.l8
New Mexico apparently followed the reasoning of the Colorado
court." Although the New Mexico court cited Light and even though
the fact situation indicates that the owner must have known of a
probable or sure trespass, the court found no liability. Other state
courts, however, interpreted their fence laws differently and followed
the ruling in Light.8
A related problem which confronted the government on its pub-
lic lands concerned checkerboard land holdings. Due to these patterns
of alternating public and private ownership, a landowner frequently
could, by fencing his own lands, prevent access to the public domain.
The patterns included juxtaposed public and private lands, alternat-
ing holdings of different private owners, and non-adjacent parcels of
leased land alternating with either federal land or land of other les-
sees. 9 The checkerboards, which originated through grants to rail-
roads as incentives for building lines west and grants to states for the
benefit of schools, have created a headache for the government. The
United States has frequently gone to court to free its lands from these
restrictive fences and the federal courts have consistently held that
a rancher cannot fence his land so as to enclose the public land."0
Although Congress can prescribe rules governing the public
lands, the state may prescribe regulations which do not interfere with
15 Bell v. Gonzales, 35 Colo. 138, 83 Pac. 639 (1905).
'6Williamson v. Fleming, 65 Colo. 528, 530, 178 Pac. 11, 12 (1919); Richards v.
Sanderson, 39 Colo. 271, 278-79, 89 Pac. 769, 771 (1907).
17Hill v. Winkler, 21 N.M. 5, 151 Pac. 1014 (1915) (trespassing defendant cut down
fence around a well).
18 Dorman v. Erie, 63 Mont. 579, 208 Pac. 908 (1922); Chilcott v. Rea, 52 Mont. 134,
155 Pac. 1114 (1916).
19 For examples of cases involving checkerboard patterns of land holdings, see: Cam-
field v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897) ; United States v. Morrell, 331 F.2d 498
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, Chournos v. United States, 379 U.S. 879 (1964); Oman
v. United States, 195 F.2d 710 (10th Cir. 1952) ; Chournos v. United States, 193
F.2d 321 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 977 (1952) ; Kunzler v. United States,
208 F. Supp. 79 (D. Utah 1961), appeal dismissed, 307 F.2d 511 (10th Cir. 1962).
20Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897); Stoddard v. United States, 214
Fed. 566 (8th Cir. 1914) ; United States v. Bernard, 202 Fed. 728 (9th Cir. 1913);
Lillis v. United States, 190 Fed. 530 '(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 223 U.S. 726 (1911);
Hanley v. United States, 186 Fed. 711 (9th Cir. 1911); Simpson v. United States,
184 Fed. 817 (8th Cir. 1911) ; Bircher v. United States, 169 Fed. 589 (9th Cir.
1909) ; Carroll v. United States, 154 Fed. 425 (9th Cir. 1907) ; Krause v. United
States, 147 Fed. 442 (8th Cir. 1906) ; Cardwell v. United States, 136 Fed. 593 (9th
Cir. 1905), cert. denied, 215 U.S. 599 (1909); Thomas v. United States, 136 Fed.
159 (9th Cir. 1905).
For a report of a recent controversy in Wyoming and in Congress, see: The Rocky
Mountain News, Oct. 4, 1965, p. 5, cols. 4-5; Id., Oct. 6, 1965, p. 5, cols. 4-5; Id.,
Oct. 7, 1965, p. 55, cols. 1-3; Id., Oct. 8, 1965, p. 40, cols. 2-3; Id., Oct. 10, 1965,
p. 5, cols. 3-5.
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and are not inconsistent with the congressional regulations.2 The
states do not have power to confer the right to graze upon the public
lands ;2" they can merely control grazing.23 State controls generally were
of three forms, each favoring various dominant interests in the states :24
legislation to prefer local stockmen over stockmen from other states;
fence laws protecting stockmen against settlers ;25 and legislation pro-
tecting classes of livestock growers 6 - especially cattlemen from
sheepmen.2 State courts declared the statutes of the first type -
those preferring local stockmen - unconstitutional28 but the Supreme
Court upheld fence laws' and the laws discriminating against sheep-
men."0 These discriminations found their legal basis in the wide-
spread belief that sheep ruin the range for cattle and that exclusion
of sheep is necessary in order to preserve the range." Even federal
range regulations reflected this preference. 2
The continuing range wars and continuing range deterioration
provided the impetus for enactment of a federal statute to regulate
grazing on the public lands. A fifteen-year political battle over closer
21 McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353 (1922) ; Denee v. Ankeny, 246 U.S. 208
(1918) ; Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343 (1918) ; Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S.
311 (1907) ; Itcaina v. Marble, 56 Nev. 420, 55 P.2d 625 (1936) ; Big Butte Horse
& Cattle Ass'n v. Anderson, 133 Ore. 171, 289 Pac. 503 (1930).
2 Notes 6, 7, and 21 supra. With the establishment of the National Forests and passage
of the Taylor Grazing Act, Congress has pre-empted the field. However an Arizona
court has held that even though the state cannot issue grazing permits for federal
lands [Schell v. White, 80 Ariz. 156, 294 P.2d 385 (1956)], if a Taylor Grazing Act
permit expires and the government fails to act on the renewal application, the state
law governs until the government acts. In Garcia v. Sumrall, 58 Ariz. 526, 121 P.2d
640 (1942), the court held that the former permit-holder was a month-to-month
tenant and could enforce a trespass action against anyone but the United States.
3Big Butte Horse & Cattle Ass'n v. Anderson, 133 Ore. 171, 289 Pac. 503 (1930).
2 4 Carpenter, The Public Domain in Colorado, 13 RoCKY MTN. L. REv. 296 (1941).
2 The fence laws allowed livestock to graze any place not enclosed by fences; i.e., the
farmer had to fence his fields to exclude grazing animals. See discussion in text at
note 16 supra.
26 Lamoreaux v. Kinney, 41 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1930) ; State v. Brace, 49 Idaho 580, 290
Pac. 722 (1930).
2 7 Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343 (1918) ; Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311
(1907) ; Lamoreaux v. Kinney, 41 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1930) ; Big Butte Horse & Cattle
Ass'n v. Anderson, 133 Ore. 171, 289 Pac. 503 (1930).
28 People v. McPherson, 76 Colo. 395, 232 Pac. 675 (1925); State v. Butterfield Live
Stock Co., 17 Idaho 441, 106 Pac. 455 (1909) ; Hostetler v. Harris, 45 Nev. 43, 197
Pac. 697 (1921).
2 9 Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320 (1890) ; Lazarus v. Phelps, 152 U.S. 81 (1894) (al-
though not always approving their application by the state courts).
3 0 Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343 (1918) (sheep could not graze range pre-
viously grazed by cattle) ; Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311 (1907) (no livestock graz-
ing within two miles of any dwelling.- a measure directed at the ubiquitous sheep).
31- Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311A 1907 ).
3Dastervignes v. United States, 122 Fed. 30, 31 (9th Cir. 1903). A regulation pro-
hibited grazing of sheep and goats except in areas where rainfall would insure "rapid
renewal of herbage and undergrowth" and allowing grazing by other livestock as long
as "injury is not being done the forest growth and water supply .. "
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federal management of the public lands"3 culminated in enactment of
the Taylor Grazing Act in 1934.11
I1. TAYLOR GRAZING ACT - ADMINISTRATION
Congress passed the Taylor Grazing Act in order to benefit and
stabilize the livestock industry," to protect grazing rights and privi-
leges,3" and to provide "the most beneficial use of the public range.""'1
To carry out these purposes, the administration of the act is vested in
the Bureau of Land Management. 8 The Bureau's job is to manage
and improve the range by eliminating overgrazing which thereby pre-
vents erosion on public and private lands. As more demands arise for
use of the public domain, the Bureau is also faced with the problem
of selecting the highest or most beneficial use of the public lands. 9
The Director of the Bureau oversees agencies for each of the ten
major public land states."0 A District Manager is in charge of each of
these agencies, which in turn, supervises several grazing districts.
The Act sets up an Advisory Board for each District.4 Holders
of grazing permits elect the members of the District Boards, with each
class of stockmen (cattlemen and sheepmen) represented. The State
Director appoints one additional member-a wildlife representative.3
The District Advisory Boards make recommendations on a variety of
matters connected with range management.43 As the name implies,
33 The political machinations leading up to its approval by Congress are discussed in de-
tail by several scholars and government administrators: CALEF & WESLEY, PRIVATE
GRAZING AND PUBLIC LANDS (1960); CLAWSON & HELD, THE FEDERAL LANDS:
THEIR USE AND MANAGEMENT 45-47, 81-112 (1957); FoSs, POLITICS AND GRAss
(1960); PEFFER, THE CLOSING OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, 214-231 (1951); PENNY
& CLAWSON, ADMINISTRATION OF GRAZING DISTRICTS IN THE PUBLIC LANDS 461
(1962).
34 Taylor Grazing Act, note 7 supra.
35 Chournos v. United States, 193 F.2d 321, 323 (10th Cir. 1952); United States v.
Achabal, 34 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D. Nev. 1940).
3 6 Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173 (1956); Red Canyon Sheep Co. v. Ickes, 98
F.2d 308, 314 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
37 48 Stat. 1269 (1934), 43 U.S.C. § 315 (1959); Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S.
173, 177 (1956) ; Red Canyon Sheep Co. v. Ickes, 98 F.2d 308, 314 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
Cf. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
38 The Bureau of Land Management (referred to in this paper as the Bureau or as the
BLM) consolidates the functions of the General Land Office and the Grazing Service
under the 1946 Reorg. Plan No. 3, sec. 402(2), effective July 16, 1946.
39 See discussion in text note 159 infra.
40 Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah,
and Wyoming.
41 Details of the BLM administrative set-up to adminster the Taylor Grazing Act are
contained in 43 C.F.R. §§ 4110-4115.2 (1965), known as the Federal Range Code.
4243 C.F.R. § 4114.1 (1965).
4343 C.F.R. § 4114.1-5 (1965). The framers of the act developed a commendable idea
with the provision to manage the range in consultation with the range users. Such an
arrangement undoubtedly facilitated a more harmonious implementation of the act.
The knowledge and experience which the stockmen brought to the Bureau, interacting
with the formal training and practical experience in range management of the Bureau's
personnel, led to a better understanding of each point of view by the other.
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the function of the Board is strictly advisory; the BLM officials may
accept or reject any of the Board's suggestions or recommendations as
they see fit."
When a rancher applies for a grazing permit the Advisory Board
considers it first" and makes a recommendation to the District Man-
ager, explaining the reasons for any unfavorable reports. " The Dis-
trict Manager issues a tentative decision." If the applicant wishes, he
may "protest" at a hearing before the Advisory Board. After this
formal hearing, the Advisory Board reconsiders its advice and again
reports to the Manager. The District Manager, still free to reject the
Board's advice, issues the final decision.48 If he still disapproves, the
applicant may institute a formal appeal as provided by the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act.49
The applicant's rights of appeal under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act do not begin until rendition of the final decision by the
District Manager. This has led to some confusion among applicants,
as it constitutes a hearing after the first adjudication, whereas the
Administrative Procedure Act contemplates hearings held prior to
adjudication." Because of this, the BLM conducts grazing appeals
under rules different from those used to hear other appeals. Fre-
quently, to their misfortune, applicants follow the general Bureau
Hearing Procedures5' rather than those for Grazing Proceedings.52
To launch the hearing procedure the appellant sends his appeal,
stating the grounds on which it is based, to the District Manager who
forwards it to the State Director. The State Director, as the adverse
party, may file a motion for dismissal which the appellant may an-
swer." The State Director, after collecting the appeal materials, for-
wards them to a Hearing Examiner who promptly rules on the motion
for dismissal, if any, and sets a date for the hearing if he has not dis-
missed the case.
The Hearing Examiner, an officer of the Department of the In-
terior, holds hearings on all contests of administrative action involv-
ing the BLM-controlled public domain. He must conduct the hearing
"in an orderly, impartial, and judicial manner," and has authority to
subpoena witnesses, rule upon offers of proof and relevancy of evi-
4443 C.F.R. § 4115.2a-1; § 4115.2a-4 (1965).
443 C.F.R. § 4115.2-1(a) (2) (1965).
"43 C.F.R. § 4115.2-1 (a) (4) (1965).
47 Ibid.
4843 C.F.R. § 4115.2-1(b) (1965).
4943 C.F.R. § 4115.2-3 (1965).
5 0 E. L. Cord, dba El Jiggs Ranch, Int. Graz. Dec. 634 (1957).
5143 C.F.R. § 1850 (1965).
5243 C.F.R. § 1853 (1965).
53 43 C.F.R. § 1853.1(d)'(1965).
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dence, make findings of fact and conclusions of law, and render a de-
cision.54 Where possible, the parties stipulate all material facts and
issues involved.
The evidentiary rules used by the Department at hearings are
less stringent than the ones used in the courts and are identical to
those generally accepted for federal administrative hearings."5 Hear-
say is admissible, if corroborated by other evidence, 6 and the govern-
ment uses photographs extensively to demonstrate such things as
overgrazed range, excessive numbers of livestock and illegal entry.
Witnesses testify under oath and may be cross-examined either by
the opposing party or by the Hearing Examiner.
The hearing opens with a brief statement by the government
counsel describing the facts leading to the appeal. The appellant,
having the burden of proof, then offers his case.57 The Examiner
may, with or without motion by the government, then issue summary
dismissal because of insufficiency of the appellant's case. Assuming
the hearing continues and there is a proper showing of interest, " in-
tervenors- usually permit-holders affected by the protested permit
- may present their case. Finally the Director offers his evidence,
"if such a presentation appears to the Examiner to be necessary for a
proper disposition of the matters in controversy ... "'9
The Examiner makes findings of fact and conclusions of law and
writes a decision which he sends to the parties. A verbatim transcript
is taken of all BLM hearings; this record and the decision are avail-
able for any appeal." Either party may appeal from the Examiner's
decision to the Director of the Bureau."' Parties file briefs62 and may
request a hearing and oral argument, which the Director may allow
at his discretion."' Under similar provisions either party may appeal
from the Director to the Secretary of the Interior. 4
A curious provision allowing the Director of the Bureau to re-
quire the Examiner to "make only a recommended decision" and sub-
5443 C.F.R. § 1853.3 (1965).
5543 C.F.R. § 1853.5(c)(1965).
56 E. L. Cord, dba El Jiggs Ranch, Int. Graz. Dec. 634 (1957) ; Mrs. Myrtle Colvin, Int.
Graz. Dec. 245 (1941).
575 U.S.C. § 1009(a) (1959); E. L. Cord, dba El Jiggs Ranch, Int. Graz. Dec. 634
(1957) ; William Sellas, Int. Graz. Dec. 526 (1950); Leandro Muniz, Int. Graz. Dec.
302, 304 (1942) ; R. B. Hackler, Int. Graz. Dec. 274 (1942) ; King Bros., Int. Graz.
Dec. 114, 117 (1938).
58 5 U.S.C. § 1009(a) (1959) ; Bert and Paul Smith, 67 Int. Dec. 300 (1960) ; Bert and
Paul Smith, 66 Int. Dec. 1 (1959); William S. Young, 66 Int. Dec. 113 (1959).
5943 C.F.R. § 1853.5(c) (1965).
6043 C.F.R. § 1853.7(a) (1965).
6143 C.F.R. § 1853.7(b) (1965).
6243 C.F.R. § 1853.7(b)(1965).
6343 C.F.R. § 1843.5 (1965).
6443 C.F.R. § 1844.1 (1965).
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mit it to the Director for him to adopt as his decision65 has its counter-
part in the appeal procedure from the Director to the Secretary. If,
prior to the Director's "promulgation" of his decision, the Secretary
approves it, he may not entertain the appeal, but instead adopts the
Director's decision.66 While these shortcuts sound like an arbitrary
deprivation of the right to appeal, the purpose is to simplify the route
to the courts, i.e., more appellants can obtain judicial review with
fewer departmental appeals and less expense. In grazing cases how-
ever, the process has served as a shortcut to nowhere. When used, it
not only deprives the applicant of the complete administrative appeal
procedure, but, since less than a dozen reported appeals have reached
the courts since 1934,67 it seems not to have attained its purpose.
Statements by courts that an order of the Secretary is not judicial-
ly reviewable,68 which may have discouraged court appeals, contradict
both the Administrative Procedure Act69 and the Federal Range
Code.70 If the BLM has acted arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts
can examine its action.71 "The Court cannot exercise the agency dis-
cretion, but it can inquire into whether that discretion has been prop-
erly exercised.'
Only rarely have the courts reversed the Secretary. Most fre-
quently the decision results in an opinion like that in Adams v. United
States,7" in which the court stated: "Since the agency findings are
supported by substantial evidence and since the agency decision is not
arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise unlawful . . . the trial court proper-
ly upheld the agency decision .... ""
Rights acquired under the Taylor Grazing Act may be protected
65 43 C.F.R. § 1853.6(b) (1965).
66 43 C.F.R. § 1844.1 (1965).
67 See Section IV infra.
68 Sellas v. Kirk, 200 F.2d 217, 220 (9th Cir. 1952); United States v. Wiley's Cove
Ranch, 295 F.2d 436, 440 (8th Cir. 1961); Hamel v. Nelson, 226 F. Supp. 96, 98
(N.D. Calif. 1963) ; accord, Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450, 459 (1920)
(prior to Administrative Procedure Act) ; Ross v. Day, 232 U.S. 110 (1914); Whit-
comb v. White, 214 U.S. 15 (1909) ; Quinby v. Conlan, 104 U.S. 420 (1881) ; Jones
v. Ickes, 65 F.2d 197 (D.C. Cir. 1933) ; City of Los Angeles v. Borax Consolidated
Ltd., 5 F. Supp. 281 (S.D. Calif. 1933), rev'd on oiher grounds, 74 F.2d 901 (9th
Cir. 1935), affd, 296 U.S. 10 (1935); Wyoming v. Franke, 58 F. Supp. 890 (D.
Wyo. 1945), where the court said it could not interfere with what it considered an
abuse of discretion and in which the judge strongly disapproved of the administrative
action [establishment of Jackson Hole National Monument when Congress had refused
to do so].
6960 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1959).
7043 C.F.R. § 1853.8(b) (1965).
7160 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e). Oman v. United States, 179 F.2d 738 (10th
Cir. 1949) ; See also Oman v. United States, 195 F.2d 710 (10th Cir. 1952).
72 Bedke v. Quinn, 154 F. Supp. 370, 371 (1D. l'daho 1957).
73 318 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1963) (non-grazing case but illustrative of the judicial treat-
ment of appeals from decisions of the Secretary on Bureau hearings).
74 Id. at 873.
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in the courts against unlawful action by the Secretary. 5 Moreover,
unlawful or ultra vires acts of the BLM officials may be enjoined,
even though the Secretary of the Interior has not been made a party
to the action.76
III. NATURE OF THE RIGHT UNDER THE ACT
Grazing on the public lands had existed traditionally at the suf-
ferance of the federal government;77 the Taylor Grazing Act replaced
that "right by sufferance" with a "right by permission." The courts
recognize that the right to graze is a valuable one,7" as is the right to
a grazing permit.7" Not only by the terms of the Act,8" but also by ad-
ministrative and judicial decisions," ranchers who had grazed on pub-
lic lands prior to the enactment of the law received a preference over
those who had not. Such a preference was approved in McNeil v.
Seaton," in which the court voided application of a Special Rule83
which, by changing the priority period, deprived the plaintiff of his
preference over newcomers to the local ranching business.84 The court
said that McNeil was justified in relying on the preference granted by
Congress and in investing his time, effort, and capital to develop his
stockraising business.
McNeil upholds "adequately safeguarded" grazing privileges85
which, as the dissent points out, seem to amount to vested rights in
continuation of the permit in derogation of the Supreme Court prece-
dents and the Taylor Grazing Act itself.8" As long as the stockmen
5 Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173 (1956); McNeil v. Seaton, 281 F.2d 931,
933 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Red Canyon Sheep Co. v. Ickes, 98 F.2d 308 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
See discussion of these cases in text following, respectively notes 89, 82, and 81 infra.
78 Bedke v. Quinn, 154 F. Supp. 370, 372 (D. Idaho 1957) ; See also non-grazing cases,
e.g. Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Pierson, 284 F.2d 649 (10th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 936 (1961) ; Adams v. Witmer, 271 F.2d 29, 35 (9th Cir. 1958).
See discussion of a new venue statute in text at note 103 infra.
7 Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 352 (1918) ; Light v. United States, 220 U.S.
523, 535 (1911) ; United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911) ; Buford v. Houtz,
133 U.S. 320, 326 (1890) ; Lamoreaux v. Kinney, 41 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1930).
78 McNeil v. Seaton, 281 F.2d 931, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1960) ; Osborne v. United States, 145
F.2d 892 (9th Cir. 1944).
79 McNeil v. Seaton, 281 F.2d at 934; Red Canyon Sheep Co. v. Ickes, 98 F.2d 308, 316
(D.C. Cir. 1938).
80 48 Stat. 1270 (1934) (amended by 61 Stat. 790 (1947)), 43 U.S.C. § 315(b) (1959).
81 Red Canyon Sheep Co. v. Ickes, 98 F.2d 308, 314, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
82 281 F.2d 931, 936 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
8 19 Fed. Reg. 8954 (1954).
84 281 F.2d at 937-38. As it turned out in application, McNeil had not lost his rightful
preference. His allotment under the special Rule exceeded that under his old priority
period. McNeil v. Udall, 340 F.2d 801, 802 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
904 (1965). See discussion in text at note 105 infra.





are given the "privilege"87 of using public lands, each should receive
this privilege under the same conditions; however, the stockman who
has built up his business should have an assurance of continued avail-
ability of grazing lands. On the other hand, this right should not
build into a "vested right" for permanent grazing since that amount
may later damage the range or the government might find a better
use for the land.
While the federal courts defined the grazing permit as a prefer-
ence and a privilege, other courts have considered different aspects.
The rights are sufficiently possessory to be taxable within the mean-
ing of a statute imposing a tax on property of the United States held
under lease.8 The rights, derived through the United States, prevail
over the aboriginal rights of the Navajos to their traditional grazing
grounds since the Navajos have relinquished their rights to the United
States by treaty. Nonetheless, the Navajos may enforce their rights
against everyone but the United States. 9 The permit holder can re-
cover from the government for damage caused by a forest fire which
spread due to the fault of the government. Since the interest is rev-
ocable, it cannot be used to force the state to construct cattle passes
under a limited access highway.9
The holder has an interest of compensable nature by statute, but
only in some respects.92 The courts, in accordance with the Taylor
Grazing Act,93 have stated that a grazing permit creates no vested
property rights. 4 While the government need not pay for the value
of a permit revoked or lost through eminent domain proceedings, it
must pay for the enhanced value to the land caused by an appurtenant
permit. 5 Thus, land with a grazing permit attached is worth more
8 7 Red Canyon Sheep Co. v. Ickes, 98 F.2d 308, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1938). The right granted
by the Taylor Act permit is a "privilege [which was] a proper subject of equitable
protection against an illegal act."
88 Sproul v. Gilbert, 225 Ore. 442, 359 P.2d 543 (1961).
8 9 Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173 (1956).
90 Wilkinson v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ore. 1960). In this case the permit-
holder had died, and title to the base land transferred to the plaintiffs. Since the plain-
tiffs had failed to apply for a permit, they had no rights of recovery for the tort. The
court distinguishes Garcia v. Sumrall, 58 Ariz. 526, 121 P.2d 640 (1942), where the
action was against a third party, not the United States, and the permit had not termi-
nated.
91 Fauske v. Dean, 78 S.D. 310, 101 N.W.2d 769 (1960).
92 56 Stat. 654 (1942), 43 U.S.C. § 315(q) (1965). This allows for compensation for loss
of grazing permits taken for military purposes.
9348 Stat. 1270 (1934) (amended by 61 Stat. 790 (1947), 43 U.S.C. § 315(b) (1959).
94 United States v. Cox, 190 F.2d 293 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 867 (1951) ;
Fauske v. Dean, 78 S.D. 310, 101 N.W.2d 769 (1960) ; Bassett v. Ryan, 72 Ariz. 383,
236 P.2d 458, 460 (1951). Contra, Bartlett v. Galleppi Bros., 33 F. Supp. 277 (N.D.
Cal. 1940) (dictum).
95United States v. Jaramillo, 190 F.2d 300, 302 (10th Cir. 1951). Followed in State
Highway Comm'n v. Fortune, 77 S.D. 302, 91 N.W.2d 675 (1958). Cf. McDon-
ald v. McDonald, 61 N. M. 458, 302 P.2d 726 (1956), where the government was
renting ranchlands with appurtenant permits and the payments were based on, among
other factors, cancellation of the Taylor Grazing Act permits.
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than the same land would be without such a permit -not only in
sales between private parties,. but also in forced sales to the govern-
ment. Companion cases in the Tenth Circuit arrived at conclusions,
confusing, but separable on their facts: United States v. Jaramillo"s
held the government liable for the permit value where the permits re-
mained in effect; but United States v. Cox" denied it where the per-
mit was withdrawn as part of the condemnation.
IV. ATTACKS AGAINST AND OPERATION OF THE ACT
A. Attacks
1. Constitutionality-Indispensable Party.
That no full-fledged attacks upon the constitutionality of the act
developed is probably attributable to the fact that similar Forest Serv-
ice grazing controls had been approved several times. 8 In addition,
the courts had frequently recognized the unexercised right of the fed-
eral government to control the public domain - a right stemming
directly from the ConstitutionY9 The only attempt thus far to attack
the constitutionality of the Taylor Grazing Act failed when several
Oregon sheep raisers missed the opportunity to present their constitu-
tional arguments to a federal court because they could not muster the
jurisdictional amount.1'
Only a few court attacks on the operation of the act have oc-
curred. Blocking court review were early holdings that the Secretary
of the Interior was an indispensable party to grazing appeals since
the appeals sought action by him through his subordinates.'0 ' In order
to acquire jurisdiction over him, the applicant had to sue in the Dis-
trict of Columbia." 2 Most stockmen found the expense of maintaining
such a suit prohibitive. The 87th Congress rectified this situation by
amending the venue statute to allow suit against the Secretary in any
jurisdiction where the cause of action arose or where the land in ques-
96 190 F.2d 300 (10th Cir. 1951).
97 190 F.2d 293 (loth Cir. 1951).
98 Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911) ; United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506
(1911).
99 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343 (1918) ; Buford v.
Houtz, 133 U.S. 320 (1890).
100Gavia v. Donaugh, 93 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1937). If they then took the case to the
state court, it apparently never reached the Oregon Supreme Court.
101 Warner Valley Stock Co. v. Smith, 165 U.S. 28 (1897) ; Richman v. Beck, 257 F.2d
575 (10th Cir. 1958) ; Sellas v. Kirk, 200 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1952).
102McNeil v. Leonard, 199 F. Supp. 671 (D. Mont. 1961) ; Palmer v. Walsh, 78 F.
Supp. 64 (D. Ore. 1948). See, e.g., McNeil v. Seaton, 281 F.2d 931, 933 (D.C. Cir.




tion was situated." 3 The rush of appeals Congress expected from the
liberalized venue provisions has yet to materialize: the only reported
appeal since 1962 went to trial in the District of Columbia.'
Only one suit so far has sustained a rancher's claim of arbitrary
handling of a permit application - McNeil v. Seaton."m The Grazing
District in which McNeil's lands were located instituted a Special
Rule which changed the base period for establishing preferences from
1929-1934 to 1948-1952. The court voided the Special Rule as it ap-
plied to McNeil, saying, "We see no basis upon which, by a special
rule adopted more than twenty years after appellant had embarked
upon his [livestock raising] venture, he may lawfully be deprived of
his statutory privilege.' °" A prior case, Sellas v. Kirk,"°7 had reached
a contrary result -concluding that promulgation of a Special Rule
was not even judicially reviewable (and that, even if it were, the Sec-
retary was an indispensable party) .' These cases are distinguishable
since McNeil made a showing that the Special Rule discriminated
specifically against him whereas the Special Rule in Sellas applied
103 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1962). In recommending the legislation, the Senate report, S.
Rep. No. 1992, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), pointed out:
Frequently these proceedings involve problems which are recurrent but peculiar
to certain areas, such as water rights, grazing land permits, and mineral rights.
These are problems with which judges in those areas are familiar and which
they can handle expeditiously and intelligently.
The Tenth Circuit had offered another solution to the indispensable party dilemma
in Pan American Petroleum v. Pierson, 284 F.2d 649, 653 (10th Cir. 1960). Here
the Secretary was not an indispensable party, where no action was required of him,
and a BLM official had exceeded his authority (in this case by canceling an oil and
gas lease). Boesche v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472 (1963), affirms a decision the court says
is in "seeming conflict" with the Pan American case, but the opinion reaches only the
power of the Secretary to cancel a lease, not that of a regional official of the Bureau.
104 McNeil v. Udall, 340 F.2d 801 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
105 281 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
106 Id. at 937. His was a hollow victory. On remand the Bureau found that his rights
under the 1929-1934 preference period amounted to 143 animals, compared with 232
under the subsequent base period. [McNeil v. Leonard, 199 F. Supp. 671 (D. Mont.
1961) ]. This probable determination had been recognized in the dissent in the orig-
inal case [281 F.2d at 938, n.1] McNeil then attempted to assert greater rights in
the Montana District Court, but ran afoul of the indispensable party requirement.
[McNeil v. Leonard, 199 F. Supp. 671 (D. Mont. 1961)). Finally, four years later,
the District of Columbia court rendered the coup d'etet by supporting the BLM's de-
terminations. [McNeil v. Udall, 340 F.2d 801 (D.C. Cir. 1964)].
107200 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1952).
108 The Special Rule involved the calculation of the "base" [43 U.S.C. § 315(b) '(1959)1.
For example, grazing areas in the Colorado high mountains are "land base" because
since they cannot be used all year, their use is limited by the amount of land the
rancher has available elsewhere for winter grazing. On the other hand, in the south-
western deserts where use of the federal range is limited by the amounts of water
available to water the animals during the dry season, a "water base" applies. In this
Nevada grazing district he _Advisory Boa.rd, due to special conditions in the district.
had recommended a Special Rule combining the two- 2/3 land and 1/3 water. By
its application, the Board and District Manager reduced plaintiff's allotment from pre-
Taylor Act use of 2500 sheep to 1000 sheep under the Special Rule.
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equally to all permittees." Actually this is a distinction without a
difference since a Special Rule can discriminate individually whether
it changes the base property allowance or the preference period. If
any Special Rule discriminatorily vitiates one rancher's rights while
benefiting another's, the injured party should be given recourse to
the courts.11
2. Mining Claims.
The Taylor Act extends to grazing permits on the surface of un-
patented mining claims. Despite broad language in the mineral
laws". and related cases,"' the Tenth Circuit decided that the exclu-
sive right of possession of the surface is limited to mining purposes;
therefore, the government, as title-holder of the land, can control
grazing thereon."3 Congress confirmed case law to this effect by the
Multiple Use Act of 1955 which specifically awarded to the govern-
ment control over uses of the surface of unpatented claims other than
mining."
4
The courts have held that the locator has no tort claim for dam-
ages caused by grazing under Bureau auspices on the surface of his
mining claim."' Moreover, the government cannot recover damages
for illegal grazing on an unpatented claim which was later patented."'
A holder of an unpatented claim was allowed to recover damages,
109 Wade McNeil, Int. Graz. Dec. 667, 668 (1957). One fact not mentioned by the court
in either case '(and very likely pertinent to the decisions) is that McNeil had operated
under the Act's regulations since 1936; Sellas never had. In fact, he (Sellas) insisted
that the Taylor Act could not curtail the grazing to which he had been accustomed
prior to its enactment:
Mr. Sellas' appeal indicates a fundamental misconception on his part of the
effect which the Taylor Grazing Act has had on his right to use the Federal
range in his livestock operations. This misconception has apparently re-
mained with Mr. Sellas over the years. . . . [I]t appears to be largely re-
sponsible for his continued insistence that his grazing operations on the
Federal range must not be changed or curtailed in any manner from what
those operations were on the public domain prior to passage of the Taylor
Grazing Act. ... Wm. Sellas, Int. Graz. Dec. 677, 678 (1958).
510 200 F.2d at 220.
111 17 Stat. 91 (1872), 30 U.S.C. § 26 (1959) (Locators have "exclusive right of pos-
session and enjoyment of all the surface included within the lines of their loca-
tions .... ").
112 See, e.g., Clipper Mining Co. v. Eli Mining & Land Co., 194 U.S. 220, 226 (1904);
Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306, 316 (1930).
11 United States v. Etcheverry, 230 F.2d 193, 196 (10th Cir. 1956)("[W)e hold that
under the statute, general grazing rights of the public domain are not included in the
possessory rights of a mining claim."). See also Teller v. United States, 113 Fed. 273
(8th Cir. 1901 ) (timber) ; United States v. Rizzinelli, 182 Fed. 675 '(D. Idaho 1910)
(timber); Ward v. Chevallier Ranch Co., 138 Mont. 144, 354 P.2d 1031, 1033
(1960) (dissent); Coos Bay Timber Co. v. Bigelow, 228 Ore. 469, 365 P.2d 619
(1961) (government can sell timber on claim where no discovery has been made).
But see United States v. Deasy, 24 F.2d 108 (D. Idaho 1928) (timber) (citing the
Teller and Rizzinelli cases as holding the opposite of their actual decisions, and fol-
lowing the purported holdings).
11469 Stat. 368 (1955), 30 U.S.C. § 612(b) (1959).
115 Powell v. United States, 233 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1956).
"6 United States v. Etcheverry, 230 F.2d 193 (10th Cir. 1956).
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not against the government, but against the grazer even though the
latter was operating under a Forest Service permit."' In this case a
Montana statute governed the right of recovery for trespassing ani-
mals on "agricultural or grazing land or patented mining claims,""'
but because an unpatented claim was involved, the statute was found
inapplicable. However, the court found the grazer liable for trespass
because of a jury finding that the boundaries of the land involved
were sufficiently well marked to place persons on notice. It is inter-
esting to note that a 1963 amendment to the statute extended its ef-
fect to unpatented mining claims."'
3. Tort Claims.
A series of cases brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act 2'
have established the principle that grazers, in proper circumstances,
can recover damages from the government.' Moreover, a tort action
lies if the Bureau wrongfully aids, allows, abets, or encourages other
livestock operators to use the public domain already granted an-
other." The Tort Claims Act does not apply to claims based on the
exercise or failure to exercise a discretionary function, "whether or
not the discretion involved be abused.' "" Thus, because both the re-
fusal to grant exchange of use permits and the imposition of govern-
ment carrying capacity standards on a checkerboard landowner .24 are
discretionary actions, they probably are not compensable under the
Federal Tort Claims Act.' Even the granting of a permit to a third
party, where the government knows the animals will trespass, does
not constitute a tortious act."0
B. Operation
To solve the problem of checkerboard patterns of private and
public land holdings, the Federal Range Code sets up "Exchange of
Use" permits2' where, by negotiation, a holder of alternating parcels
agrees to exchange certain parcels which he holds for certain govern-
ment lands and to give the government control of his land for grazing
11
7 Ward v. Chevallier Ranch Co., 138 Mont. 144, 354 P.2d 1031 (1960).
118 MONT. REV. CODE § 46-1413 (1947).
1
9 MoNT. REV. CODE § 46-1413 (Supp. 1963).
120 Codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (1965).
121 Notes 113 and 115 supra; accord, the Multiple Use Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 982 (1964),
43 U.S.C. § 1391 (Supp. 1964).
12 Oman v. United States, 179 F.2d 738, 742 (loth Cir. 1949).
12 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) *(1948).
124 See textual discussion of checkerboard land patterns following note 18 supra.
125 United States v. Morrell, 331 F.2d 498 (loth Cir. 1964).
,2,t ., Chournos V. Uited Statcs, 1,93 F.2d 321 (10th Cir. , -)Kuzlcr v. TTited
States, 208 F. Supp. 79 (D. Utah 1961), appeal dismissed, 307 F.2d 511 (10th Cir.
1962).
12 43 C.F.R. § 4115.2-1(h) (1965).
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purposes. As a result, the government allows him to graze on govern-
ment land and he allows the government permittees to graze upon
his land. The same arrangement is used when the permittee owns
non-contiguous segments of base lands which alternate with Taylor
Grazing Act land. Exchanges are made to enable the holdings to be
contiguous.
Administrative problems in these exchanges arise from the BLM
principles of range management. The landowner seeking the ex-
change must agree to the Bureau-established grazing practices. Con-
cerned with a profitable livestock operation, he frequently calculates
a higher grazing capacity than does the Bureau, whose concern centers
on restoration and maintenance of good range. If be refuses to agree
to the Bureau's levels of grazing, the BLM can refuse to issue ex-
change permits. His property thereby becomes useless: cattle cannot
graze on his unfenced land without trespassing on government land;
if they do, the Bureau will prosecute for trespass. Therefore the
Bureau has him cornered - he must either graze according to the
carrying capacity as determined by the BLM or not graze at all.
Much of the litigation in the past ten years has arisen because the
BLM has begun a re-evaluation of its lands. Its appropriations have
quadrupled in the past ten years; it no longer needs to farm out the
responsibility for administering the permit program to ranchers' co-
operatives.128 During this recent re-evaluation, it has surveyed the
range and made significant reductions in grazing on some over-
stocked lands."'
Judging by these actions of the Bureau, criticisms of the Bureau
for poor range management are sound."' The agency has taken steps
to further reduce grazing; the number of animals on the federal range
dropped from fourteen million in 1949 to twelve million in 1962.
This reduction seems a steady trend and allows the range to recover
from years of misuse. The livestock operators are realizing the pur-
pose of government controls over grazing by the improvement in the
range.' The improved range will eventually increase carrying ca-
pacities which must in turn be subject to strict scrutiny to ensure its
carrying the maximum number of animals per acre. Even so, demands
128 See, e.g., Wade McNeil, Int. Graz. Dec. 667, 64 Int. Dec. 423 (1957). The South
Phillips Cooperative Grazing District issued grazing permits to take the load from the
underfunded and undermanned BLM.
19McNeil v. Seaton, 281 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1960) ; Wade McNeil, Int. Graz. Dec.
667, 64 Int. Dec. 423 (1957). See text following note 105 supra.
130 CALEF, PUBLIC GRAZING AND PUBLIC LANDS (1960) ; Note, Management of Public
Land Resources, 60 YALE L.J. 455 (1951).
131 See United States v. Thompson, 41 F. Supp. 13, 15 (E.D. Wash. 1941), noting the
improvements in range managed by the Forest Service, particularly the 95% increase
in carrying capacity. See also Rocky Mountain News, June 9, 1965, p. 5, cols. 1-3,
and The Denver Post, June 11, 1965, p. 22, cols. 1-2, to the same effect.
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on the BLM for other uses of the public lands may limit the land
available for grazing.
V. ATTEMPTS AT ENFORCEMENT BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
The first extensive litigation under the act occurred when a per-
mittee attempted to enjoin issuance of temporary licenses and collec-
tion of fees under the act. After the government failed in its attempt
to block the suit,"' the Nevada Supreme Court declared that a blanket
fee for all grazing districts, as temporarily set by the Land Office,
was not consistent with the requirement of the act that the fees be
reasonable,'33 since range conditions varied from one grazing district
to another.'34 The United States Supreme Court disagreed and held
that Congress had ratified the temporary blanket fee system by using
the money collected therefrom for range improvement. 3' The perma-
nent fee system subsequently adopted, provided a blanket fee for all
districts. Disposition of this litigation also reversed a decision by a
Nevada federal judge which had voided the fees. 3"
The Bureau has successfully enforced provisions of the act
through injunctions,3' contempt actions,'38 trespass actions,"" and
under the authority of state statutes." However, a dispute involving
a group of Navajo Indians on the one hand and the Bureau and its
white permittees on the other resulted in a rare setback for the gov-
ernment in its administration of the Taylor Grazing Act.' The
controversy began when certain grazing land adjacent to the Navajo
Indian Reservation in southeastern Utah was incorporated into the
Monticello, Utah, Grazing District. The Navajos continued to graze
their animals on this land which they claimed as their prehistoric
aboriginal home and grazing land. Before the permittes had won
132 United States v. Dewar, 18 F. Supp. 981 (D. Nev. 1937) ; Dewar v. Brooks, 16 F.
Supp. 636 (D. Nev. 1936).
33 48 Stat. 1270 (1934) (amended by 61 Stat. 790 (1947)), 43 U.S.C. § 315(b) (1959).
14 Brooks v. Dewar, 60 Nev. 219, 106 P.2d 755 (1940).
n5 Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U.S. 354 (1941). The appropriations coincided with the pro-
visions for disposal of permanent fees under 43 U.S.C. § 315(i) and (j), which the
Court cited in approving the temporary fees.
13" United States v. Achabal, 122 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1941), reversing 34 F. Supp. 1 (D.
Nev. 1940). In Brooks v. Dewar, 60 Nev. 219, 106 P.2d 755 (1940), the Nevada court
cited this federal district court decision as influential.
13 7 Kenndey v. United States, 119 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1941).
138 United States v. Montgomery, 155 F. Supp. 633 (D. Mont. 1957).
139 Richman v. Beck, 257 F.2d 575 (10th Cir. 1958); United States v. Hosteen Tse-
Kesi, 191 F.2d 518 (10th Cir. 1951) ; Alton Morrell & Sons, 72 Int. Dec. 100 (1965).
140 United States v. Hatahley, 220 F.2d 666 (D. Utah 1955), rev'd, Hatahley v. United
States, 351 U.S. 173 (1956).
The iitigation involved the following cases, chronologically: United States v. Ros-
teen Tse-Kesi, 93 F. Supp. 745 (D. Utah 1950), rev'd, 191 F.2d 518 (10th Cir.
1951); Young v. Felornia, 121 Utah 646, 244 P.2d 862 (1952); United States v.




two court attempts to remove the Indians' stock from BLM land,"'
the Indians had returned to their reservation. Since the Indians con-
tinued to graze their animals on this land, the permittees next pre-
vailed upon the Bureau and the San Juan County Commissioners
to gather up the Navajo livestock under the authority of the Utah
Abandoned Horse statute.'43 The Bureau field men seized animals
they claimed were abandoned and shipped them to a Provo packing
house. The Navajos then sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act 44
and prevailed in the Utah District Court at a trial described by the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals as having been conducted "in an
atmosphere of maximum emotion and a minimum of judicial im-
partiality . . .""' The Tenth Circuit reversed the judgment, holding
that by proceeding under the Abandoned Horse statute the BLM
officials had acted in harmony with the Taylor Grazing Act. More-
over, the court concluded, despite provisions in the act for levying
fines on livestock owners who failed or refused to remove their
animals from lands under Taylor Act administration, the Utah
statute covered an entirely different subject - those animals aban-
doned by their owners. 4 '
The Supreme Court reversed.4 7 Noting that "[U]nauthorized
grazing on the federal range and the removal of trespassing live-
stock is expressly provided for by section 161.11 (b) "8 of this [Fed-
eral Range] Code," '149 the Court declared that "both the written
notice and failure to comply are express conditions precedent to the
employment of local procedures. The code is, of course, the law of
the range, and the activities of federal agents are controlled by its
provisions."' 50  A conflicting state statute applied discriminately
cannot be used by Bureau agents. The Court found liability and
reversed because the government agents knew that the horses had
not been abandoned; in fact, they knew who the owners were:
"[Tlhe government agents were not exercising due care in their
enforcement of the federal law.. .. The agents proceeded with com-
plete disregard for the property rights of petitioners."''
142 United States v. Hosteen Tse-Kesi, 191 F.2d 518 (10th Cir. 1951); Young v. Fe-
lornia, 121 Utah 646, 244 P.2d 862 (1952).
143 UTAH CODE ANNO. §§ 47-2-1 to -7 (1953).
144 For other tort claims suits see text at note 120 supra.
145 220 F.2d 666, 670 (10th Cir. 1945).
14
6 Id. at 672.
1
47 Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173 (1956).
148 Now 43 C.F.R. § 4112.3 (1956).
1
49 Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 177 (1956).
'50Id. at 178.
151 Id. at 181.
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VI. MANAGING THE LANDS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
The claims under the Tort Claims Act illustrate the dilemma
which confronts the BLM and the courts in grazing cases. On the
one hand the Bureau must manage the public domain for the benefit
of the public by improving the range and preventing overgrazing
and consequent erosion of the public lands. On the other hand, the
public lands have been, and will continue to be, a mainstay of the
livestock industry of the West. When the ranchers have their per-
mitted grazing reduced, either their expenses go up or their produc-
tion goes down.
While the rancher and the Bureau parry over grazing permits,
other pressures are building up for use of the public land. The
West is developing into a more urban community, and demand for
use of the public lands now comes not only from the traditional
users like the livestock owner, logger, and miner, but also from urban
residents such as the hiker, fisherman, hunter, and scientist. The
BLM is finding that it must satisfy the needs of more and more
people."' The grassland in western Colorado, eastern Oregon, or
mid-Nevada will not remain remote, unwanted, and unattractive.
The Taylor Grazing Act directs the BLM to manage its lands
"in order to promote the highest use of the public lands .... "1, The
act authorizes the Secretary to exchange public lands for private
lands, within or without the boundaries of the grazing districts, and
to issue a patent for the exchanged land if:
1. The land received by the United States is of at least equal
value;
2. the land received is within the same state, or else within a
distance of not more than 50 miles in the adjacent state
nearest the base lands; and
3. the exchange will benefit the public interest.5 4
The first two requirements are mechanical problems which the ad-
ministrative agencies and the courts are accustomed to handling. The
third one is both a judicial and a legislative issue. Does the "public
interest" as used in the Taylor Grazing Act mean public interest in
grazing or a broad public interest, not restricted to grazing and con-
servation - the multiple use benefit?
In the 1963 case, LaRue v. Udall,"5 the court held that "public
152 Hochmuth, Government Administration and Attitudes in Contest and Patent Proceed-
ings, 10 RoCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAw INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 467 (1965).
15348 Stat. 1269 (1934), 43 U.S.C. § 315 (1959).
154 48 Stat. 1269 1272 (1934), 43 U.S.C. §§ 315, 315g(b) (1959).
15 324 F.2d 428 (D.C. Cir. 1963). Since one of the findings of the Secretary was that
the public interest in grazing was benefitted by the exchange, the judge objecting to
a broad interpretation of "public interest" concurred in the holding.
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interest" means the latter. In this case the Secretary had found the
public interest under the act was not restricted to grazing and con-
servation, but rather included reclassification of lands within the
grazing district and opening such lands to uses other than grazing
if they were more beneficial. 5 ' Since the act also provides that the
granting of a permit does not create any right, title, interest, or estate
in the lands, a permit holder in the land to be exchanged could not
protest the withdrawal of his privilege.15
Subsequent to this case Congress has recognized the changed
circumstances by enacting two measures directed at the issues dis-
cussed by the court in LaRue. A Public Land Law Review Commis-
sion has been appointed to review all the laws on public lands 58 and
one of its particular targets will be the welter of legislation govern-
ing the Bureau of Land Management and especially that dealing
with its authority to issue patents and grazing permits. Also, the
Public Land Law Review Act15 and the Multiple Use Act of 1964160
have extended to the BLM principles which had been previously
established for the National Forests by the Multiple Use Act of 1960.
Thus, Congress in passing these acts has indicated a desire to en-
courage land use in harmony with the criteria set up by the Outdoor
Recreation Resources Commission and also to manage all the federal
land so as to benefit the entire public. Consequently, the recent pub-
lic debate over whether the public lands should be disposed of as
rapidly as possible or retained in the "public interest" has temporar-
ily been settled in favor of the public interest in multiple use.
The Taylor Grazing Act fits into the multiple use framework.
Multiple use includes not only consumptive use of land such as min-
ing, timber production and the like, but also non-consumptive uses
(uses not compatible with the long-held idea of rapid disposal of the
public lands) such as fish and wildlife development, recreational
uses, wilderness preservation, watershed protection - and grazing.
The Taylor Grazing Act seems to have little need for revision.
The Public Land Law Review Commission should investigate permit
evaluation in eminent domain proceedings, reasonable grazing fees,
156 Id. at 430.
157 48 Stat. 1270, 1272 (1934), 43 U.S.C. §§ 315(b), (f) (1959).
15878 Stat. 982 (1964), 43 U.S.C. § 1391 (Supp. 1964).
159 ibid.
160 78 Stat. 986 (1964), 43 U.S.C. § 1411 (a) (1965). The Multiple Use Act directs the
Bureau to protect its vast holdings for either disposal or retention. The disposal cri-
teria are predicated on county zoning. For retained land, the act lists the following
criteria for management: grazing; fish and wildlife development; industrial develop-
ment related to resource production (although it cannot be developed if the land
passes to non-federal ownership); mineral production; occupancy in harmony with
protection of resource values; outdoor recreation; timber production; watershed pro-
tection; wilderness preservation; or preservation of other public values.
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and the need for an impartial Hearing Examiner system. In addi-
tion it should affirm the definition of public interest, as contained
in the majority opinion in LaRue; not only in relation to the Taylor
Grazing Act, but also in relation to the total federal public lands
program.
The principles approved by Congress in the Multiple Use Act
of 1964 recognize the change in the West since the days of the open
range in the last half of the nineteenth century. The Public Land
Law Review Commission should follow this declaration of policy
in examining the mass of legislation surrounding the public lands
and in recommending which laws shall govern the public domain in
the last half of the twentieth century.
